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OBLIGATION, ANARCHY, AND
EXEMPTION
AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES
OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY. By
Abner S. Greene.1 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. 2012. Pp. ix + 333. $49.95 (cloth).
Micah Schwartzman

2

People embrace philosophical anarchism for different
reasons. Sometimes anarchists adopt this view, which holds in
3
part that there is no general moral duty to obey the law, because
they are disillusioned with or alienated from the modern state,
which they may believe is oppressive, exploitative, or unjust.
Others may be attracted by utopian ideals that have difficulty
flourishing under existing political regimes. Sympathy for
anarchism might also arise from confrontation with laws
believed to be draconian, morally obtuse, or worse—for
example, drug laws, prohibitions on homosexual conduct, or
mandatory military conscription. In some cases, people become
skeptical about the existence of political obligations because,
despite the best efforts of generations of political philosophers,
they have yet to encounter a persuasive argument for the
proposition that states have a moral right to command their
4
general obedience.

1. Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
2. Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. For helpful comments
and discussions, I thank Leslie Kendrick, James Nelson, and Richard Schragger.
3. As discussed below, see infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text, philosophical
anarchists not only reject political obligation but also the legitimacy of all existing states.
For defenses of this view, see ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM
(1970); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979);
Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey the Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND MORALITY 233–49 (2d ed. 2009).
4. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS 102–04 (2001) (describing various motivations for philosophical
anarchism).
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Yet another path to philosophical anarchism might begin
with reflection on the problem of religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws. Twenty years ago, in the aftermath of
5
Employment Division v. Smith, Abner Greene proposed a novel
theory for why the state ought to provide constitutional religious
6
exemptions. He argued that the two Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment—the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause—were best interpreted as balancing against
each other. Under the Establishment Clause, laws must be based
primarily on secular purposes, rather than on religious convictions. The reason is that religious beliefs are not publicly
accessible, and so relying expressly on such beliefs to justify laws
would unfairly exclude nonbelievers. But at the same time,
limiting the role of religious beliefs in the democratic process
effectively excludes religious believers. Since their views are not
represented in the process, they have no reason to obey the laws
produced by it. To remedy this problem, the Free Exercise
Clause provides religious exemptions from the law. If believers
have no say in how the law is made, then at the very least, the
law should account for their exclusion by accommodating them
7
to the extent possible.
Initially, this argument for religious exemptions might seem
like a fairly straightforward application of a political process
theory. Religious citizens are disadvantaged in the democratic
process. As a result, courts should exercise judicial review in a
manner that provides them with special protections in the form
of constitutional exemptions from laws that substantially burden
their beliefs and practices. But this theory can point toward
more radical and anarchical possibilities. If citizens are owed
legal exemptions because they have no reason to obey laws
resulting from an exclusionary political process, perhaps they
should receive exemptions whenever they conscientiously object
to laws that they otherwise have no duty to obey. After all,
political exclusion is only one reason why citizens might lack
political obligations. If there are others, then perhaps the state
should widen the scope of its legal exemptions to cover them as
well.
In Against Obligation, Abner Greene develops this general
line of argument. Without abandoning his earlier balancing
5. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6. Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J.
1611 (1993).
7. Id. at 1634.
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theory of the Religion Clauses, he now argues for a broader and
more ambitious set of claims focused on the idea of “permeable
sovereignty,” which holds that citizens have a plurality of
obligations based on their religious and philosophical views,
family responsibilities, ethnic and tribal affiliations, and so on (p.
20). These sources of obligation may conflict with the state’s
demands, and Greene argues that there is no reason to privilege
the latter. Citizens should treat all of their obligations as having
equal standing, rather than giving presumptive weight to their
political obligations (pp. 2, 117). Moreover, Greene argues,
when citizens have competing duties and lack political
obligations, states should provide them with a form of exit
through legal exemptions, unless doing so would threaten
compelling state interests (p. 118).
In addition to rejecting conventional accounts of political
obligation, Greene devotes two substantial chapters to arguing
against what he calls “interpretive obligation” (p. 11), which
includes fidelity to constitutional law and modes of legal
interpretation that require deference to past authorities (such as
original meaning or precedent) and to interpretive authorities
(such as the Supreme Court). Just as citizens have plural sources
of obligations that compete with their political obligations, legal
interpreters confront diverse sources of legal meaning, none of
which should be given presumptive authority. In short, according
to Greene, citizens and public officials should both reject the
general idea of fidelity to the law.
In showing how attacks on political obligation are
continuous with challenges to constitutional fidelity and judicial
supremacy, Against Obligation demonstrates the sustained force
of a skeptical approach to a broad array of claims concerning
legal authorities. Densely argued and provocative, the book
should be of interest to lawyers concerned about matters of
religious freedom, constitutional interpretation, and the obligations of judges and political officials. It should also interest
philosophers who may be somewhat less familiar with the
constitutional and judicial implications of a skeptical or
anarchical approach to political obligation.
In what follows, after summarizing Greene’s main arguments against political obligation and in favor of exemptions, I
raise two questions about the position defended in the first half
of the book, while leaving aside for purposes of this review the
interesting and important discussions of interpretive obligations
presented in the later chapters. The first question is whether
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Greene is committed to philosophical anarchism, despite his
repeated and emphatic protestations to the contrary. The second
is whether Greene’s account of political obligation and his
conception of permeable sovereignty are adequate to support a
full range of religious exemptions, including some paradigmatic
examples. Even if there are reasons to deny political obligation
and to adopt a view near to, and perhaps identical with,
philosophical anarchism, that theory may not be well-suited to
justifying accommodations for many citizens who confront the
law with competing religious and moral obligations. For those
who aim to defend a robust exemption regime, anarchism may
be less helpful in many cases than more conventional arguments
based on the values of freedom and equality.
I. FROM OBLIGATION TO EXEMPTION
The first half of Against Obligation is devoted to
establishing two claims: first, that citizens lack general duties to
obey the law and, correlatively, that states have no authority to
impose them; and second, that states should provide legal
exemptions as a partial remedy for their political illegitimacy.
Before raising some questions about these claims, I provide a
brief summary of Greene’s main arguments for them.
A. REJECTING POLITICAL OBLIGATION
Greene begins his attack on political obligation by offering
some parameters for his argument. He describes political
obligations as moral requirements—whether duties or
8
obligations —to obey the law. These requirements are prima
facie (or, more accurately, pro tanto) obligations, which are
taken to be defeasible or open to being overridden by conflicting
obligations. Such obligations are also content-independent,
meaning that one has a duty to obey the law simply because it is
the law, rather than because there is a moral reason to comply
with the content of the law. Furthermore, political obligations
must be general in the sense of applying to “all laws at all times”
(p. 15), as well as to all citizens. In sum, Greene follows standard

8. Since nothing here turns on the distinction, I shall follow Greene in using the
terms “duty” and “obligation” interchangeably as describing moral requirements. But see
SIMMONS, supra note 3, at 14–15 (discussing various differences between duties and
obligations).
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accounts of defining political obligation as a general, content9
independent, defeasible, moral duty to obey the law (pp. 14–20).
Greene also endorses and defends the correlativity thesis,
which holds that a state’s political legitimacy is correlative with
10
the existence of its citizens’ political obligations (pp. 24–29).
Although Greene does not discuss the Hohfeldian logic of this
thesis, the basic idea is that a legitimate state has a claim right to
rule and that citizens have a correlative duty to obey. If citizens
have no political obligations, then a state cannot have a right to
rule. Thus, if a state’s legitimacy is defined in terms of it having
such a right, then the rejection of political obligation is also a
rejection of the state’s political legitimacy. As Greene writes,
“[P]olitical legitimacy is correlated with political obligation—
when one is present so is the other; when one is absent so is the
other” (p. 27). Somewhat confusingly, Greene calls this the
11
“justification conception” of political legitimacy (p. 32), but I
shall refer to it simply as the correlativity conception.
In contrast to this standard view of political legitimacy,
Greene describes a second and more minimal account, which
holds that a state is legitimate whenever it maintains a
functioning legal system consistent with basic rule of law values
(p. 24). We might call this the legality conception. Greene argues
that it is too thin to support political obligations. A more robust
conception of legitimacy would add to the requirements of
legality demands for democratic participation and institutional
rules that satisfy a threshold of political justice. But Greene
claims that even a state that meets these additional demands
does not have the right to alter the moral duties of its subjects
and to require their obedience (p. 25).
In rejecting the legality (and somewhat thicker) conceptions
of legitimacy, Greene effectively replicates an important
distinction, drawn by A. John Simmons, between justification
and legitimacy. According to Simmons, a state is justified when it
9. See William A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10
LEGAL THEORY 215, 215–17 (2004) (“The obligation at issue . . . is usually taken to be
prima-facie, comprehensively applicable, universally borne, and content-independent.”).
10. For criticisms of the correlativity thesis, see Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy
Without the Duty to Obey, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (2010); KENT GREENAWALT,
CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 47–61 (1989).
11. I say confusingly because, as discussed below at notes 12–14 and accompanying
text, it is possible to distinguish between the concepts of justification and legitimacy. See
SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 126–30. I think Greene’s terminology makes it more difficult
to track the content of this distinction. It might make sense to do that if he rejected the
force of the distinction, but he appears to accept it.
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is “on balance morally permissible (or ideal) and . . . rationally
12
preferable to all feasible nonstate alternatives.” A justified
state may generate or maintain important public goods, such as
an effective legal system and just political and economic
institutions. But this is not sufficient for a state to acquire
legitimacy, which Simmons describes as the state’s moral right
“to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to
have its subjects comply with these duties, and to use coercion to
13
enforce the duties.” On this view, a just state might be justified
but nevertheless illegitimate, at least in the sense of lacking the
exclusive right to create, impose, and coercively enforce moral
14
duties upon those within its jurisdiction.
To bridge the gap between a state’s justification and its
legitimacy, at least under something like the correlativity
conception, requires an argument showing that citizens have a
duty to obey states that have certain positive moral attributes
(e.g., legality or justice) or that produce certain public goods
(e.g., stability, the rule of law, democratic participation). Like
others who are skeptical about political obligation, Greene
claims that no such argument is available. He groups existing
accounts of political obligation into three categories: agentcentered, status-based, and state-centered (pp. 6–8). Agentcentered arguments focus on actions taken by a state’s subjects
that might give rise to political obligation. These include most
famously consent and its weaker cousin, tacit consent, as well as
fair play theories and arguments based on the value of political
participation. An account is status-based when it relies on rolebased or positional obligations. For natural duty theories, the
relevant role is the subject of a just (or justified) state, whereas
theories of associative obligation emphasize citizens’ special
obligations to their compatriots. Finally, state-centered accounts
focus on the need for states to provide political stability, social
coordination, institutional settlement, and other important
public goods.
12. Id. at 126.
13. Id. at 130.
14. One could accept the conceptual distinction between justification and
legitimacy but argue that a state’s justification may be sufficient, at least in some cases, to
establish its legitimacy. Like Simmons, Greene clearly rejects this view. But for a competing account, see JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION (2011), ch.
4. Quong defines legitimacy in terms of the state’s right to impose and coercively enforce
duties on agents, although he stops short of saying that legitimacy entails a duty to obey
the law. For present purposes, however, the important contrast is with the claim that
legitimacy may be a function of a state’s justification. As Quong writes, “[A] certain kind
of liberal state is justified and is legitimate for that reason.” Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
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In the first (and longest) chapter of the book, Greene sets
about demolishing all of these accounts of political obligation
(pp. 35–113). Although developed with nuance and sophistication, the main lines of argument are familiar from the existing
literature, and I will not rehearse them here. The basic strategy,
15
pioneered by John Simmons more than thirty years ago, is to
line up the various positive accounts and show how they,
singularly and in combination, fail for one or more reasons.
If there is a unifying thread or theme to Greene’s attack on
political obligation, however, it is usefully summed up in his
16
invocation of “rule-sensitive particularism” (p. 100). Morally
responsible individuals cannot blindly follow the rules (or laws)
imposed by the state. Because they confront a plurality of
conflicting sources of moral obligation, they must continuously
evaluate the balance of reasons available to them in particular
contexts. In their decision-making, they ought to take into
account the systemic benefits of following the law as the state
demands. But there is no reason, on Greene’s view, to think that
the state is either morally or epistemically better situated than
individuals to determine whether, all-things-considered, they
ought to obey the law. That judgment is always a particular one,
made with sensitivity to rules and the goods they provide, but
never fully determined by them (pp. 100-01).
Given the correlativity conception of political legitimacy,
Greene’s rejection of political obligation means that the state is
illegitimate, at least in the sense that it has no right to demand
obedience from those subject to its control. Rather, on Greene’s
view, the state has what he calls “permeable sovereignty,” which
is contrasted with “plenary” sovereignty (p. 33). A state has
plenary sovereignty when it has the moral right to require that its
subjects obey all of its laws. Its sovereignty is permeable when its
demands for obedience must be weighed in the balance with
citizens’ other sources of moral obligation. In some cases, the
state may nevertheless be justified in imposing duties to obey
specific laws. That will be true when following the law is morally
required, regardless of the state’s demands for compliance, as in

15. See SIMMONS, supra note 3, chs. 3–7 (rejecting arguments from consent, tacit
consent, fair play, the natural duty of justice, and gratitude); see also A. John Simmons,
Associative Political Obligations, 106 ETHICS 247 (1996) (rejecting arguments from
association obligation).
16. Greene borrows the phrase from FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE 97 (1991).
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the case of laws prohibiting murder and other mala in se crimes.
But the state may be able to justify imposing duties in other
cases as well, when all-things-considered, the morally right
course of action is to follow its commands. The rejection of
general, content-independent, political obligations is thus
compatible with the existence of duties to comply with certain
laws. Such duties may be justified by various considerations
underlying some of the standard accounts of political obligation
(e.g., consent, fair play, social coordination), or some
combination of those considerations. Whether any particular
demand for compliance is justified, however, must be assessed
independently and on its own merits, without relying on the
notion that the state has any general claim to a presumption in
favor of its moral authority.
B. EXEMPTIONS AS PARTIAL REMEDIES
A state with permeable sovereignty will sometimes be
justified in imposing moral duties and demanding that its
subjects comply with them. But when the state lacks such
authority, Greene argues that it ought to provide exit options
through legal exemptions. Of course, as Hume long ago
17
recognized, most people are in no position to exit the state. The
costs are too high for emigration to be an either realistic or
reasonable option (p. 117). Instead, Greene suggests, legal
exemptions can serve as “[r]epresentations of exit” (p. 114). By
accommodating conscientious objectors, the state provides a
“partial remedy” for its unjustified impositions upon them.
Exemptions cannot fully remedy the state’s illegitimacy, since
they cannot establish the conditions for the state’s right to
demand general obedience. But a robust exemption regime can
at least ameliorate conflicts between the state and those who
claim that they cannot, in good conscience, comply with the law
(pp. 114–15).
Greene adopts a balancing approach to legal exemptions.
To screen out frivolous cases, he argues that conscientious
objectors should be required to initiate claims against the state
(pp. 118–19), and they must show that the law substantially
burdens their sincere religious or moral views (p. 130). If an
objector establishes these elements of a claim, the burden shifts
to the state to show, on a case-by-case basis, that granting an
17. David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND
LITERARY 462 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1985).
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exemption would threaten a compelling state interest. Thus, the
right to a legal exemption is not absolute, but merely prima facie.
Claims for exemptions can be defeated if the state can
demonstrate that it is morally justified in requiring compliance
with the law (p. 123).
Although nearly all of Greene’s examples of exemptions
involve religious claims, it is worth emphasizing that his moral
argument from permeable sovereignty is not limited to those
with religious objections but rather “includes all deeply held
sources of normative authority” (p. 124). In extending his theory
in this way, Greene departs from existing and prior First
Amendment doctrine, which has never explicitly authorized
exemptions for overtly non-religious claims of conscience.
Given the breadth of its scope, Greene’s theory of
“represented exit” sits uneasily next to his earlier claim, which
he repeats here for consideration as a possible “stand-alone
argument” (p. 149), that religious believers have a special
constitutional right to judicial exemptions, one that does not
apply to those with non-religious claims of conscience. I have
18
already mentioned the outlines of this argument above, and
19
elsewhere I have offered various criticisms of it. For now, I
merely observe the incongruity of claiming a special set of legal
exemptions for religious conscientious objectors, when the entire
argument would appear to be swamped by larger considerations
stemming from Greene’s more general denial of political
obligation. If the First Amendment states a case for privileging
20
religious over non-religious conscientious claims, Greene would
seem to be in a good position to criticize the law for failing to
provide non-believers with some positive basis for adjudicating
their prima facie claims of conscience. It is puzzling why he is so
21
circumspect about the constitutional rights of non-believers.

18. See Greene, supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
19. See Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special? 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
1351, 1390–95 (2012).
20. I have suggested some possible interpretations of the First Amendment that
close the gap between religious and non-religious claims of conscience. See id. at 1414–26.
21. Greene acknowledges that “[o]ne could construct an argument for judicial
exemptions beyond religious practice, as a matter of constitutional right” (p. 116), and he
briefly mentions some possibilities without settling on anything specific and, for that
matter, without stating that non-religious conscientious objectors are morally entitled to
exemptions as a matter of constitutional law.
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II. WHY NOT ANARCHISM?
Despite the title of his book, and his forceful attack on
political and interpretive obligations, Greene claims that he does
not “endorse anarchism, of either the philosophical or political
stripe” (p. 32). Indeed, Greene is concerned enough about the
risk of being labeled an anarchist that he repeats his denial in the
book’s penultimate paragraph, declaring that his “argument is
not for anarchy” and that “government may play a role . . . in
seeking and perhaps even achieving a more harmonious
republic” (p. 253). These statements abjuring anarchism are
difficult to reconcile with Greene’s views about political
obligation, which seem to place him squarely within the skeptical
tradition of philosophical anarchism that has been developed
and refined over the last few decades with greater clarity,
22
precision, and sophistication than ever before.
Greene’s rejection of philosophical anarchism is
unpersuasive. This is primarily because he accepts the two main
propositions to which all anarchists are committed, namely, that
all states are politically illegitimate and that there is no general
23
duty to obey the law. Indeed, at times, Greene appears to
embrace a strong version of philosophical anarchism, what
Simmons calls a priori anarchism, which holds that it is morally
impossible for citizens to give presumptive authority to the
24
state. According to Greene, citizens cannot consent or take
some other voluntary action (such as receiving benefits from the
state), inhabit some role or status, or defer to a practical
authority in a manner that creates a general obligation to obey
the law. As he says: “One can never displace the authority for a
normative judgment” (p. 101). Of course, citizens may be
morally required to comply with specific laws. But no anarchist
denies that proposition. The central question is whether there
are, and indeed could ever be, general political obligations, and,
assuming the correlativity conception of legitimacy, whether the
22. See especially A. John Simmons, Philosophical Anarchism, in FOR AND
AGAINST THE STATE 19–39 (John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson eds., 1996). Simmons’
essay, which is the clearest and most sophisticated exposition of philosophical anarchism
to date, is reprinted in SIMMONS, supra note 4, ch. 6.
23. See SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 107 (“This, we may say, is the minimum moral
content of anarchist judgments of state illegitimacy: the subjects of illegitimate states
have no political obligations.”).
24. In contrast to a priori anarchism, a posteriori anarchism holds that while it is
possible for states to have political legitimacy and, correlatively, for citizens to have
political obligations, no actually existing states are legitimate, and no citizens (or very
few) have political obligations. See id.at 104–07.
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state is, or could ever be, politically legitimate. To the extent he
rejects political obligation and its logical correlate, political
legitimacy, Greene does, in fact, embrace the central tenets of
philosophical anarchism.
Greene attempts to resist this conclusion in a few ways.
First, he identifies weaker conceptions of political legitimacy
that the state might satisfy. The legality conception mentioned
above is one possibility. Since many states maintain recognized
and effective legal systems that comply with and promote rule of
law values, Greene says this “version of political legitimacy is all
around us” (p. 32). But this response cannot distinguish
Greene’s view from philosophical anarchism, because he
concedes that the legality conception is not sufficient to generate
political obligations. States may have the moral authority to
impose some laws, but acknowledging that fact does not yield a
right to demand general compliance with the law.
Second, Greene argues that unlike philosophical anarchists,
he believes the state is justified in providing important public
goods, which private action, including the use of markets, is
incapable of supplying (p. 33). But this response is based on a
conflation of the distinction noted above between the state’s
25
justification and its legitimacy. Although a state might be
morally justified in the sense that it is effective in solving
coordination problems or in maintaining decent and even just
institutions, it might nevertheless be politically illegitimate in not
26
having the right to demand general obedience to its laws.
Sensitivity to the distinction between justification and legitimacy
allows philosophical anarchists to say exactly what Greene wants
to say, which is that states may have significant moral virtues,
even if they lack presumptive moral authority.
Finally, Greene distinguishes his position from anarchism
by claiming that, on his view, “we do better living under the rule
of a government in a liberal democracy than we would
otherwise” (p. 5). One might wonder why, if this is the case,
Greene does not reject the correlativity thesis and claim that
liberal democratic states are politically legitimate in the sense of
being morally justified, even if they cannot always demand
compliance with the law. But philosophical anarchism has a

25. See supra notes 12–14, and accompanying text.
26. See SIMMONS, supra note 3, at 198 (“Governments which are just and beneficial,
as well as responsive and open to change are not reduced to the level of tyrannical
government simply because they share with it ‘illegitimacy’ in the traditional sense.”).
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response to this question, relying again on the distinction
between justification and legitimacy. The answer is that we do
better living under many institutions and associations—including
some religious organizations, corporations, universities, etc.—
but that does not give them the right to coerce our compliance
with their rules and regulations. We might be better off living in
a world with Google in it. Perhaps Google can provide
important goods that no other firm can supply. But that does not
27
give Google the moral right to compel our use of its services.
My point here is not to press the argument for philosophical
anarchism, except perhaps to avoid certain confusions about it,
which I think Greene’s rejection of it may unfortunately
encourage. Early in his book, Greene acknowledges that his
conclusions “may seem frightening (are we living in a state of
nature? should we be taking up arms against this illegitimate
force?)” (p. 5). Repudiating philosophical anarchism might be
seen as a way to alleviate such concerns. But this is a mistake.
Philosophical anarchism may not be the correct view of political
legitimacy or political obligation, but it does not necessarily lead
to an endorsement of lawlessness, civil disobedience, or armed
resistance to the state, and certainly no more than Greene’s view
does. Instead of dismissing philosophical anarchism as a
fearsome and potentially violent doctrine, Greene’s argument
against political obligation and in favor of permeable sovereignty
is more consistently interpreted, I think, as a contribution to
anarchical political philosophy, which is itself part of a
respectable tradition of skeptical moral reflection about the
nature and limits of state authority.
III. HOW (NOT) TO JUSTIFY LEGAL EXEMPTIONS
I have suggested that Greene has no reason to reject
philosophical anarchism given his stated commitments. But
proponents of legal exemptions for conscientious objectors may
have different reasons to be concerned about relying on
anarchical claims or similar arguments based on the denial of
political obligations. More specifically, Greene’s argument that
the state should grant exemptions as a partial remedy for its
illegitimacy may not be sufficient to account for an important
range of cases, including some paradigmatic examples of
religious accommodation. In such cases, Greene’s remedial

27. See SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 136.
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strategy may be less successful than more familiar, and perhaps
less philosophically controversial, arguments based on the values
of freedom and equality.
To illustrate this concern, consider a few cases that Greene
mentions as examples in which exemptions are justified under
28
his remedial theory. The first is Goldman v. Weinberger, in
which a Jewish chaplain challenged an Air Force regulation that
prohibited him from wearing a yarmulke indoors. This might
seem like an easy case for Greene. The chaplain has a sincere
religious obligation to wear a yarmulke, and the state has no
serious countervailing interest. Because the state cannot justify
the law, at least not as applied in these circumstances, and
because Goldman has no obligation to obey it, the state should
remedy its illegitimate imposition of the law by granting an
exemption.
But Goldman turns out not to be so simple under Greene’s
theory. The chaplain in that case might well have had a specific
duty to obey the law. After all, he not only volunteered to serve
in the military, and to draw a salary from the state, but as a
military officer, he also swore allegiance to uphold the laws of
the United States. Under these circumstances, there are
colorable arguments under fair play and consent theories that
Goldman had an obligation to comply with military regulations.
Even if his receipt of public benefits and his oath of allegiance
were not sufficient to obligate him in perpetuity to obey all
otherwise valid laws—though some philosophical anarchists
might well consider his consent binding in this way—taken
together these voluntary actions undermine any claim that
Goldman was morally unencumbered in his relationship with the
state. If he did have a duty to obey the law, then he was not
29
entitled on that basis to an exemption on remedial grounds.
28. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
29. Relying on his earlier theory of religious exemptions, Greene might respond
here that Goldman had an independent basis for claiming an exemption, namely, that his
religious views were excluded in the legislative process, pursuant to the Establishment
Clause’s secular purpose requirement. Because his religious beliefs were not taken into
account in the formation of the military’s regulations, Goldman had no prima facie
obligation to obey them when they burdened his religious practice. For reasons I have
given elsewhere, see Schwartzman, supra note 19, at 1390–95, I think this argument fails.
But here I would add two further points: first, this argument will not be available in cases
when the conscientious objector’s claim is non-religious. A secular military officer would
not be in a position to invoke it. Second, it is not clear that harms from political exclusion
will always be sufficient to overcome obligations incurred on the basis of fair play
considerations or through informed consent. A person who knowingly and voluntarily
accepts public benefits (especially if they are excludable goods), or who freely consents
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If the problem in Goldman is that the state could demand at
least a limited duty to obey, in others cases the difficulty will be
that the state has not coercively enforced compliance with the
law. For example, in the paradigmatic case of Employment
30
Division v. Smith, two Native Americans were fired from their
jobs for consuming peyote, which was a banned substance under
state and federal law. If the case had involved a criminal
prosecution, it might have been fairly straightforward under
Greene’s theory, since the state almost certainly lacked a
compelling interest to enforce its prohibition on the sacramental
use of peyote. But Smith was not about a challenged criminal
conviction; rather, it involved the state’s denial of a claim for
31
unemployment compensation. The claimants in Smith were
seeking a public benefit in the form of financial assistance from
the state. Setting aside that they might thereby incur fair play
obligations to comply with state policies, the state did not
impose upon them any requirement to claim unemployment
compensation. They were not under any moral or legal duty to
seek or accept state benefits and were not, in that sense, coerced
by the state. They were incidentally burdened, and perhaps
wrongly so, but it is not obvious that the wrong involved had
anything to do with the state coercively imposing upon them a
duty to obey the law.
Even if the claimants in Smith could assert that they were
indirectly coerced by the state conditioning access to public
benefits on compliance with an unjust law, there may be other
cases in which parties seeking accommodations cannot easily
claim that they were either directly or indirectly coerced to obey
32
the law. For example, in Kiryas Joel, a community of Satmar
Hasidic Jews lobbied the New York state legislature to create a
special school district, ostensibly for the purpose of educating
the community’s handicapped children, who had suffered
33
emotional trauma attending secular schools. The question in
the case was whether the state’s effort to assist the Satmar
community was an impermissible religious accommodation
to serve in a particular role, might incur specific obligations even if that person’s
convictions were not accounted for in the provision of those benefits or in the creation of
that role. Of course, as discussed below, there might be other reasons to accommodate
even those who have incurred obligations through fair play or consent. But a remedy for
illegitimately imposing a duty to obey will not be among them.
30. Emp’t Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31. Id. at 874.
32. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
33. Id. at 690–93.
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under the Establishment Clause. (The Supreme Court held that
34
it was. ) But if the question had been whether the state had a
duty to provide financial support for a separate religious school,
the Satmar would have had no valid claim on the state, especially
not under a theory of religious exemptions as partial remedies
for the state’s political illegitimacy. The state did not require the
Satmar to send their children to public schools or to secular
35
private schools. Nor did it impose or attempt to coerce
obedience with any law that conflicted with their religious
obligations. Far from seeking a remedy for an illegitimate
demand that they obey the law, the Satmar participated in the
political system—quite successfully, as it turned out—to obtain
state subsidies for what Greene describes as a “partial exit” from
the broader social and political community (p. 146). But notice
that we are now a long way off from remedying the state’s
political illegitimacy through exit from the law. The
accommodation in Kiryas Joel is not about allowing for exit, but
rather about actively promoting and subsidizing it.
None of the religious accommodations claimed in these
three cases—Goldman, Smith, and Kiryas Joel—fits easily within
Greene’s remedial theory. Two of them, Goldman and Smith,
are probably better justified on more familiar grounds involving
the values of freedom and equality. Goldman need not deny that
he has a prima facie duty to obey the law to make out a claim for
a religious exemption. He can admit having such a duty, but
claim that the state ought to respect his religious liberty by
granting him a minor exception from its uniform regulations. He
can also argue that failure to grant such an exemption is a form
of religious discrimination, since it is highly unlikely that a
religious majority would impose a burden on its own members’
religious practices based on such an inconsequential state
36
interest. The same arguments from freedom and equality would
hold, mutatis mutandis, for the Native Americans in Smith. Even
if they were not directly coerced by the state, and even if they
had some prima facie obligation to comply with state policies
regulating receipt of public benefits, they can argue that the state
better respects the freedom of conscience if it does not require

34. Id. at 698 (“[A] State may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen
according to a religious criterion.”).
35. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding the state could not compel
Amish parents to send their children to school beyond the 8th grade).
36. For development of this line of argument, see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER &
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 88–89 (2007).
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citizens to choose between accepting public benefits and
adhering to their religious beliefs and practices. And they can
also argue that a religious majority obviously would not ban its
own sacramental use of a drug, including alcohol, except perhaps
under exceptional circumstances. That the majority did so in this
case either reflected neglectful indifference or religious dis37
crimination.
Perhaps the Satmar in Kiryas Joel could make similar
appeals to freedom of conscience and equality, but their case
does not fit the conventional pattern of religious exemptions
from the law. Furthermore, their demand for what effectively
amounts to state delegation of jurisdictional control raises
numerous and difficult questions about whether and to what
extent the state should treat religious groups as sovereign
38
powers, let alone subsidize the illiberal among them. Although
Greene offers a thoughtful and sophisticated discussion of these
issues, his claim that the state should underwrite the “partial
exit” of insular religious communities seems to beg the question
of what they are exiting from when the state has not imposed
any moral duty or otherwise placed any coercive burden upon
them.
CONCLUSION
Greene’s argument against political obligation and in favor
of permeable sovereignty is a substantial and valuable
philosophical undertaking. It is creative, thought-provoking, and
an important contribution, especially to the literature on
religious exemptions. In evaluating his attempt to link obligation
and exemption, I have raised two questions. The first is whether
Greene is committed to philosophical anarchism, despite his
insistence to the contrary. For lay readers (and perhaps some
philosophers as well), anarchism may have scary connotations.
But when carefully described, certain forms of philosophical
anarchism are committed to a balance-of-reasons approach to
moral and political obligations that shares much with, and may
indeed be identical to, the account Greene offers in his book.
37. See id. at 92–93.
38. I have elsewhere expressed skepticism about the idea of treating religious
institutions as sovereigns, at least in the sense of exercising political and coercive power.
See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Lost in
Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the Church, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
(forthcoming 2013).
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Clarity on this point is important for analytical purposes, but
also because philosophical anarchism is easily misunderstood
and sometimes mischaracterized in the existing literature.
The second question is about the limits of a theory of
exemptions based on the idea of remedying political illegitimacy.
Even if Greene can distinguish his account from philosophical
anarchism, his view rests on controversial claims about the
nature of political authority and the extent of our obligations as
citizens. Those claims are at least as contentious as arguments
for exemptions based on the values of freedom of conscience
and equality, and it is not entirely clear what is gained by
framing the debate about exemptions in terms of political
obligation. As I have tried to suggest, in many cases, questions
about duties to obey the law do not seem to be centrally at issue
in deciding whether exemptions are justified. And even when the
duty to obey is implicated, other arguments may be sufficient to
determine the issue. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that
the debate about political obligation is unimportant or
irrelevant—far from it. My point is rather that the question of
whether to grant exemptions extends beyond whether we have
duties to obey. It is a question about the state’s justification—
that is, about whether the state acts justly—and not only about
its legitimacy.

